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Intergovernmental transfers can be either conditional or unconditional with regard to the auton-
omy of local governments in spending such financial means. Although fiscal decentralisation 
has recently been quite pronounced in Eastern European transition countries, the dominance of a 
purpose- and project-oriented, down-flow transfer system is apparent. In the context of unifica-
tion, the west German municipal resource allocation system was also implemented in the eastern 
part of the country, which provides primarily unconditional transfers for local governments. 
Furthermore, in the case of adopting the principle of parallel development of fiscal capacity 
between the state and municipalities, as Saxony already has done, the intergovernmental transfer 
ratio is no longer exogenously but endogenously determined, which better guarantees a just 
resource allocation between the two jurisdictions. Since the subsidiarity principle backed by 
sufficient own fiscal resources and unconditional transfers appears to gain significance in pro-
viding local utilities, this study shows the recent Saxon experience with the unconditional trans-
fers, which can be considered for the future fiscal devolution process of Eastern European tran-
sition countries. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
The recent process of political and economic transformation in countries like the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia has not only contributed to the decentralisation 
of political structure but also significantly enhanced the fiscal autonomy of municipalities 
in these countries (Fukasaku and de Mello, 1999). In addition, the west German federal 
system was introduced in the eastern part of the country which is assumed to be the most 
well-developed system of local and regional government among EU countries making 
discretionary resources available at a municipal level and favours local autonomy and 
identity (Cheshire, 1992). In this context many similar types of public activities have re-
cently been assigned to local governments,
1 and some taxes (most notably real estate and 
municipal trade taxes) were also declared to be local taxes in these transition economies. 
However, this process has also caused some additional problems, particularly  for co-
ordinating intergovernmental fiscal affairs between the central and local governments in 
an efficient way. 
Although the intergovernmental transfer system is constructed differently from one 
country to another, the dominance of a purpose- and project-oriented grant system is 
apparent in Eastern European transition countries. The amount of down-flow transfers 
from the central government has traditionally made a substantial contribution to the total 
municipal fiscal capacity there. In other words, in adopting such abundant financial 
means, the central government in these countries will further try to lead the provision of 
local public goods and services, which, on the other hand, could make the process of car-
rying-out legally assigned public activities by municipalities less ‘self-governing’. Yet, it 
should be emphasised that a full-scale realisation of the subsidiarity principle in the field 
of local expenditure assignment should ideally be accompanied by the provision of suffi-
cient own fiscal resources and unconditional transfers which can be appropriately and 
efficiently adopted by the individual municipalities according to their own needs (Frenkel, 
1986; Hyman, 1993). For example, this has taken place in Germany in the context of in-
tergovernmental resource allocation system between the Länder and their municipalities 
                                                 
1   Major areas of responsibility which belong to such local government levels are social welfare, school 
education, cultural affairs, housing and construction, water and energy supply, waste disposal services 
as well as the provision of transport systems.   3
called Kommunalfinanzausgleich.
2 Furthermore, in the case of adopting the principle of 
parallel development of fiscal capacity between the state and municipalities, as Saxony 
already has done, the intergovernmental transfer ratio is no longer exogenously but 
endogenously determined, which better guarantees a just resource allocation between 
the two jurisdictions.  
Even though Eastern European countries continue to maintain their unitary govern-
ment system, the subsidiarity principle backed by sufficient tax income and uncondi-
tional transfers appears to be gradually gaining importance in providing local goods and 
services. Such a trend is also desirable. This study primarily compares different types of 
intergovernmental transfers adopted presently in the selected Eastern European coun-
tries and shows the recent Saxon experience with the unconditional transfers, which can 




2.   Basic Theoretical and Empirical Aspects on Intergovernmental 
Transfers for Municipalities in European Transition Economies 
 
Intergovernmental grants are aimed at rectifying not only the vertical imbalance caused 
by the unequal own tax revenues and expenditures of different tiers of governments but 
also the horizontal imbalance which is led by the different fiscal capacities among same 
level jurisdictions.
3 In the cases of existing externalities on other jurisdictions, the central 
government also needs to financially support sub-national authorities in order to guarantee 
the provision of certain public services on the local level like pollution control, inter-
regional highways, etc. (Tiebout, 1961; Oates, 1972; Davis and Lucker, 1982; Frenkel, 
1986; Ali, Lerme and Nakosteen, 1993; Boadway and Hobson, 1993; Hyman, 1993; 
Rosen, 1995; Dahlby, 1996; Ahmad and Craig, 1997). Furthermore, the amount of grants 
should vary with the local expenditure needs and inversely with local fiscal capacity, 
                                                 
2   In the context of the German state resource allocation system ( Länderfinanzausgleich) unconditional 
grants are also made from states with above-average fiscal capacities (e.g. Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg 
and Hesse) to states with below-average fiscal capacities (e.g. Saarland, Lower Saxony and New German 
Länder). In addition, the federal government offers supplementary grants to the financially weak states in 
the eastern and western parts of Germany, of which some have also conditional character (e.g. for solving 
debt service problems in Bremen and Saarland). Furthermore, all major taxes (personal and corporate in-
come taxes as well as value added tax) are shared by the federal (Bund), state (Länder) and municipal 
(Gemeinde) governments. Altogether these shared taxes currently amount to ca. two thirds of tax reve-
nues in the country. 
3   The re-allocation of fiscal resources from one level of government to another can also take place 
through sharing of tax revenues. In this case tax bases can be shared on a tax-by-tax basis, or taxes can 
be pooled and shared systematically thereafter.   4
while their distribution must be transparent and fair. More importantly, an effective trans-
fer system should neither encourage overspending nor weaken tax collection efforts on 
the sub-national level (Gage and Mandell, 1990; Jones and Cullis, 1994; Bahl and Linn, 
1994; Shah, 1994a and 1994b; Winkler, 1994; Oates, 1998). 
Transfers can be conditional (i.e. closely tied with specifications regarding the use of 
the funds and/or the performance achieved in the supported programme) or unconditional 
respecting the autonomy of local governments in spending such financial means. The 
block grants also have a conditional character; they are, however, designed to support 
broad areas of local activities (like education, environmental preservation, etc.) rather than 
specific projects. On the other hand, intergovernmental transfers can be open-ended or 
subject to certain limits. All these types of grants have advantages and shortcomings at the 
same time (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1980; Shah, 1991; Ma, 1997). In addition, the EU 
grants have been often made on the basis of the additionality principle, which requires — 
as a eligibility criterion for the supporting grants — the partial financial participation of 
local governments in providing local goods and services in its territory. 
In general fiscal stress takes place either when the costs of providing local services in-
crease faster than revenues needed to finance them, or when, at given costs of public ser-
vice provision, local government revenues are constrained by a declining economic base 
which reduces taxable resources. Following the equalisation objectives, one tends to argue 
that those municipalities and cities with greater spending needs automatically require more 
financial support from central or upper-level g overnment. Yet, the sum of grants to mu-
nicipalities should ideally be induced from the comparison of their (existing and/or antici-
pated) ‘true’ expenditure needs with local fiscal capacity from their own resources such as 
local tax revenue and fees.
4 To be sure, the expenditure behaviour of municipalities is also, 
to a great extent, influenced by their present fiscal capacity as well as by the size of local 
debts. In the provision of infrastructure, local governments tend to (critically) consider an 
increase in local taxes, especially when intergovernmental grants to municipalities do not 
adequately compensate the existing fiscal stress that is caused by large expenditure needs, 
and/or, when the total sum of local debts has already reached the maximum level  that 
should not be exceeded. 
                                                 
4   It is a widely accepted fact that ‘needs’ are subjective and, therefore, cannot be easily quantified. Never-
theless, a large number of resource transfer methods between different levels of government and of meas-
urement methods of local expenditure needs have been developed in the past and also implemented in 
many industrialised countries, which range from exclusively political to straightforward statistical ones. 
Furthermore, there have been serious and ambitious efforts to devise as well as to improve these method-
ologies, so that the so-called true financial needs of municipalities could be measured in a more effective 
and systematic way. In particular, the dispute about the relationship between the per capita level of local 
expenditure needs and the size of the municipality (in terms of population size) has not yet been fully set-
tled (Nam, 2000).   5
Compared to the case for cities and municipalities in Western Europe, those located in 
transformation countries have been confronted with more serious problems caused by the 
speedy industrial restructuring and de-industrialisation, the rapidly increasing public activi-
ties due to social, economic, health and environmental ills, as well as by the provision of 
modern infrastructure that is often better adapted to newly emerging economic activities. 
In particular, the challenges for large cities in Eastern Europe have been more immediate 
and have also become more intensified in the course of the ongoing economic and political 
transition, whereas many small- and medium-sized municipalities have suffered from fi-
nancial bottlenecks and have not been able to receive sufficient financial support from the 
central government. Furthermore, the number of self-governing municipalities grew rap-
idly in the 1990s, and their average size, measured in terms of the number of inhabitants, is 
quite small. This, in turn, has additionally limited the expansion of the local economic base 
for generating own revenues and hindered the realisation of economies of scale in collect-
ing municipal tax revenues and providing local public goods and services in these transi-
tion countries (Nam and Parsche, 2001). 
 
 
3.   Comparison of Intergovernmental Transfer Systems in Eastern 
European Transition Countries: An Overview 
 
The intergovernmental transfer system is quite heterogeneous in Eastern European trans-
formation countries. In the Czech Republic,  general (i.e. unconditional, equivalence-
oriented) grants do not exist, and all transfers from the central government are specific 
and purpose-oriented. In particular, capital grants (e.g. for hospitals, schools, water sup-
ply facilities, libraries, theatres, etc.) are allocated in line with the particular government 
programmes. On the other hand, important operating grants are provided on the for-
mula-based system, and the basic down-flow transfer sum is defined, for example, per 
pupil in the pre-school and primary school facilities, per bed in elderly peoples’ homes, 
etc. In 1999 operating grants amounted to 22 billion CZK compared to the total sum of 
intergovernmental transfers of 33 billion CZK (= ca. 16% of total budgetary revenues): 
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Table 1  Classification of recent municipal budgetary revenues according to 
the individual revenue items 
 


















28 billion PLZ 
(1994) ﬁ 49 bil-
lion PLZ (1998) 
(at 1998 prices) 
 
108 billion CZK 
(1994) ﬁ 210 billion 
CZK (1999) 
(at current prices) 
 
20 billion SKK 
(1994) ﬁ 29 billion 
SKK (1998) ﬁ 27 
billion SKK (1999) 
(at current prices) 
 
861 billion HUF 
(1995) ﬁ 1568 
billion HUF (2000) 
(at current prices) 
 
Revenues from 
local taxes and 
fees 
 
35% on average 
 
35% on average 
 
15% on average 
 





25% on average 
 
7% on average 
 
25% on average 
 
2% in 1995 







21% on average  
 
35% on average 
 
8% in 1995 
(4% in 2000) 
 
Intergovernmen-
tal transfers  
 
35% on average 
 
20% on average 
 
15% on average 
 
60% on average 
 
Bank credits & 
municipal bonds 
 
3% on average 
(1% in 1994 ﬁ 6% 
in 1998) 
 
17% on average 




10% on average 
(5% in 1994 ﬁ 12% 
in 1999) 
 
3% on average 
 
Source: Nam and Parsche (2001), Municipal Finance in Poland, the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic 
and Hungary: Institutional Framework and Recent Development, MOCT-MOST Economic Policy in Tran-
sitional Economies, 11 (2). 
 
 
In the Slovak Republic grants are made by the central government and the various state-
owned funds (like the State Environmental Fund, the State Fund for Housing Develop-
ment, etc.). Their absolute and relative significance (the latter measured in terms of the 
share of total local revenues) experienced ups and downs in the period 1994-99 with a 
peak of 5 billion SKK (= approximately 17% of the total local revenues) in 1997. Over 
two thirds of such grants were project-oriented (e.g. for providing public transport sys-
tems, construction of housing facilities, etc.) and strongly concentrated on large urban 
areas. The equalisation-oriented, unconditional transfers have usually been addressed to 
small municipalities (with less than 3000 inhabitants) that were particularly suffering 
from fiscal bottlenecks.   7
The Polish intergovernmental transfer system is quite simple and aims at achieving the 
traditional goals of relieving the local fiscal constraints, and guaranteeing and enhancing 
the quality of local goods and services provided by local governments. The additional 
assignment of maintaining elementary schools in 1996, the massive supports for general 
educational activities and the promotion of economic development of rural areas con-
tributed to the rapid growth of municipalities’ (real) revenues from ‘subsidies’ of ca. 4 
billion (= 15% of the total municipal revenues) to 12 billion (= 24% of the correspond-
ing revenues) PLZ between 1994 and 1998. On the other hand, ‘grants’ are aimed at 
financing the specific municipal infrastructure projects that are exclusively defined by 
the central government: the total sum remained quite stable at around 6 billion PLZ, but 
their share changed from 21% to 12% of the total revenues in the investigated years. 
Hungary currently has a quite complicated intergovernmental transfer system and the 
most important sources for municipal finance in this country have been grants that com-
prised around 60% of total budgetary revenues of local governments in the last 6 years. In 
general, the down-flow transfers made by the central government can be classified into 
the following different groups: (a) normative grants, (b) purpose-oriented matching 
grants, (c) deficit grants, and (d) special ‘addressed’ and ‘targeted’ subsidies for support-
ing municipal investment activities, as well as (e) the new grant for equalising fiscal ca-
pacity. The most substantial transfers are those normative (partly also equivalence-
oriented and formula-based) types that include per capita grants based on the size of 
population, grants for core public services based on the number of beneficiaries, capacity 
grants made on the basis of bed number in shelters for homeless people and matching 
grants for the tourist tax. Their share amounted to ca. 40% of the local budgetary revenues 
in 1993 but declined to 25% in 1998. Matching grants with the increasing share of ca. 
18% (1993) to 22% (1998) were mainly addressed to health care institutions. Deficit 
grants are aimed at supporting municipalities with high fiscal deficits: in 1997 840 local 
governments received ca. 6 billion HUF of which the sum increased to 12 billion HUF for 
1230 municipalities in 1999. Although the size of such deficit grants appears to be negli-
gible, they tended to discourage revenue-raising efforts of local governments and to re-
ward increasing expenditures at the same time. Investment activities related to water sup-
ply, health and social security, and education have been promoted by the addressed and 
targeted grants of which the total sum is defined annually (e.g. 52 billion HUF for 2000). 
The targeted subsidies aim at reducing the effective investment costs for promoted pro-
jects by a certain percentage share (usually 40% to 50%), while the traditionally ad-
dressed types often cover the entire investment costs. The new grants for fiscal equity 
introduced in 1999 are calculated on the basis of municipal business tax capacities and 
paid up to a given normative per capita level that varies according to municipal types (e.g. 
villages, cities, etc.). In 1999 a sum of 38 billion HUF was distributed for this purpose. As   8
a whole, the shift from a general grant system toward a more project-oriented down-flow 
transfer system was observed in the 1990s (Nam and Parsche, 2001). 
 
 
4.   The Principle of Parallel Development of Fiscal Capacity between 
State and Municipalities Integrated into the Traditional German 
Way of Determining Local Grants in Saxony 
 
With regard to the German intergovernmental financial  transfer system, the expenditure 
needs (Finanzbedarf) of a municipality are generally calculated on the basis of the so-
called major and additional weighting system (Haupt- und Nebenansätze). In the major 
weighting system (Hauptansatz) it has traditionally been assumed that the local expendi-
ture needs per inhabitant increase with the size of municipality measured in terms of num-
ber of inhabitants — the so-called Popitz law. Apart from the extra costs caused by a 
higher density of population in cases where infrastructure and social welfare activities are 
provided, this rule emphasises the fact that a central place (zentraler Ort) or a large city 
usually provides a wide scope of public services also for the surrounding regions and mu-
nicipalities. According to this weighting system, the number of inhabitants of a municipal-
ity is, therefore, multiplied by a rate (larger than 1) which gradually increases with the 
population size. For example, in Saxony, the major weight accounts for a municipality with 
4000 inhabitants to 112%, with 7500 to 122%, with 12500 to 131%, with 17500 to 138%, 
with 25000 to 140%, with 40000 to 150% and with 55000 to 160%. In practice, the major 
weighting system is supplemented by additional systems (Nebenansätze). For instance, the 
varied additional weights classified according to the number of pupils (Schüleransatz) in-
crease the major weights by some percentage points in Saxony.
5  
In order to measure the expenditure needs of a municipality, its weighted number of in-
habitants ( veredelte Einwohnerzahl), calculated on the basis of major and additional 
weighting systems, is multiplied by the amount of basic needs per inhabitant (Grundbe-
trag) which is the same state (Land)-wide. This basic sum is fixed annually so that the total 
amount of local transfers provided by the state government can be fully distributed to the 
municipalities which are, due to their higher amount of spending needs than the sum of 
their local tax revenue and other local income (including charges), entitled to the intergov-
ernmental financial allocation. Subsequently, the amount of transfers to a municipality is 
determined by the differences between calculated expenditure needs and tax capacity of 
the municipality (Parsche and Steinherr, 1995). 
                                                 
5   Central place weights for agglomerations are applied in Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland, which are 
mainly characterised by the (economic, cultural and social) spill-over of their functions to surroundings.   9
The so-called tax capacity measurement index number (Steuerkraftmeßzahl) of a mu-
nicipality consists of individual tax capacity index numbers of local taxes like real prop-
erty tax (Grundsteuer) A and B as well as trade tax (Gewerbesteuer), in addition to that 
of the municipality’s share of current income and value added tax revenue. The individ-
ual tax capacity index numbers of real property tax and trade tax are calculated when 
the (municipal-specific) basic tax amount (Steuergrundzahl) of each category of such 
local taxes is multiplied by the state-wide raising weights ( landeseinheitliche Nivel-
lierungshebesätze in %), which are legally determined in the context of the German 
intergovernmental resource allocation system (Steinherr and Parsche, 1998). 
When a municipality i is financially weak and eligible to receive unconditional transfers 
from the state (SZ), the fiscal capacity of the municipality i (FKi) for a given year t can be 
shown in a formal expression 
 
(1)   FKi,t = EGi,t + SZi,t 
 
where EGi,t consists of real property tax and trade tax revenues as well as the municipal-
ity’s share of current income and value-added tax revenue at the year t.  
As mentioned above, SZi,t is determined 
 
(2)   SZi,t = AS • ( VEi • GB – SKi,t   ) 
 
where AS = the equalisation ratio (Ausgleichsatz), VEi = the weighted number of inhabitant 
of the municipality i, GB = the basic need per capita and SKi,t = tax capacity of the munici-
pality i at the year t. The term ( VEi • GB ) shows the total sum of local expenditure needs 
calculated on the basis of major and additional weights. 
In practice, the total sum of intergovernmental transfers to municipalities is set in a 
pragmatic way. Just like the case in the previous year, municipalities continue to receive 
the same legally-fixed percentage share of total income of the state (Verbundquote) for the 
current year. As a consequence, the total transfer volume to municipalities and the (exclu-
sive and shared) tax revenue and other fiscal income of the state change annually at the 
same rate. In the emergence of an unanticipated serious fiscal stress (of municipalities and 
the state) caused by rapid expansion of local tasks and/or abrupt reduction in tax income, 
the legislators on the state level should react with an adjustment of the local grant percent-
age share and/or the changes of its calculation base. For example, according to the state 
law related to the intergovernmental fiscal transfer implemented in 1995, the free state of 
Saxony has been obliged to provide, for the municipalities, 28% of following state income 
types (Table 2):   10
•  the state’s portion of the shared taxes apportioned between the federal government and 
the states (Gemeinschaftsteuer like personal income, corporate and value added taxes) 
•  the revenue of state taxes and the participation of federal and state governments in the 
municipal trade tax (Gewerbesteuerumlage) 
•  the grants from the federal government to the state including the supplementary appro-
priations out of federal funds to financially weak states (Bundesergänzungszuweisun-
gen). 
 
Table 2   Structure of Municipal Fiscal Equalisation System in Saxony in 2001 
 
 
Provision of local grants from tax-sharing and 
other down-flow funds from the state and the 
federal government 
 
   
Types of intergovernmental transfers 




Revenues from tax-sharing 




•  the state’s portion of the shared taxes appor-
tioned between the federal government and the 
states ( Gemeinschaftsteuer like personal i n-
come, corporate and value added taxes) 
•  the revenue of state taxes and the participation 
of federal and state governments in the m u-
nicipal trade tax (Gewerbesteuerumlage) 
•  the grants from the federal government to the 
state including the supplementary appropria-





   
Unconditional transfers 





Other down-flow funds 




   
Specific and other matching transfers 




Source: The Saxon State Ministry of Finance 
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Moreover Saxon state law was slightly  modified in 1996 and additionally adopted the 
principle of the parallel development of fiscal capacity between the state and municipalities 
(Gleichmäßigkeitsgrundsatz). According to this principle, the total amount of the state 
grant to municipalities is annually fixed as before but in a far more limited way under the 
consideration of the parallel development of the municipalities’ disposable income from 
local taxes and the provided intergovernmental transfers (by the state), on the one hand, 
and the disposable state income from the (exclusive and shared) taxes and the grants from 
the federal government (to the state) minus the above mentioned grants from the state to 
municipalities, on the other (Nam, Parsche and Steinherr, 2001). 
Assume that the size of the intergovernmental transfers is fixed in the period of 0 (i.e. t 
= 0) at a certain percentage share of the income of the state. And the principle of parallel 
development of fiscal capacity between the state and municipalities applies for the year 1 
and the subsequent fiscal years. 
Under this condition 
 
         EGt + SZt                 ELt – SZt 
(3)   ——————— = ——————  




      EGt,v         ELt,v 
(4)   ——— = ——— 
      EGt–1,v        ELt-1,v 
 
where SZt = total sum of down-flow grants from the state to municipalities, EGt = tax in-
come of municipalities and ELt = tax income of the state and intergovernmental transfers 
(from other states and the federal government) to the state at the fiscal year t. EGt,v and 
ELt,v show the disposable income of municipalities and the state after the intergovernmen-
tal fiscal transfer carried out at the year t, respectively. 
Re-arranging the equation (3) 
 
                        EGt–1,v                       ELt-–1,v 
(5)   SZt = ELt • ( ——— ) – EGt • ( ——— ) 
                         Et–1                           Et–1 
 
where Et–1 = ELt–1 + EGt–1. 
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Consequently,  
                                                 ELt + EGt               Et 
(6)   ELt,v = ( ELt–1 – SZt–1 ) • ( ——————— ) = ELt–1,v • ( ——— ) 




                                                   ELt + EGt                Et 
(7)   EGt,v = ( EGt–1 + SZt–1 ) • ( ——————— ) = EGt–1,v • ( ——— ) . 
                                                  ELt–1 + EGt–1                 Et–1   
 
With SZt defined in the equation (3), ELt,v and EGt,v change at the same rate ( = Et / Et–1  ) as 
shown in equation (6) and (7). In other words, the principle of parallel development of 
fiscal capacity between state and municipalities applies at t. 
The equation (6) for the year t–1 is  
 
                                   Et–1 
(8)   ELt–1,v = ELt–2,v • ( ——— ) . 
                                   Et–2   
 
Inserting the equation (8) into (6) 
 
                                  Et                                                 Et 
(9)   ELt,v = ELt–2,v • ( ——— ) =  EL0,v • ( ——— ) 




                                 Et 
(10) EGt,v = EG0,v • ( ——— ) . 
                                E0 
 
Rearranging the equation (9) and (10) for the period t–1 
 
       ELt–1,v           EL0,v 
(11)  ———— = ——— 
       Et–1                E0 
   13
and  
 
       EGt–1,v         EG0,v 
(12) ———— = ———  . 
       Et–1               E0 
 
If the equation (11) and (12) are integrated in the equation (5) 
 
                         EG0,v                         EL0,v 
(13) SZt = ELt • ( ——— ) – EGt • ( ——— ) .  
                           E0                            E0 
 
As shown in the equation (13), the total sum of intergovernmental transfers (from the 
state to municipalities) at t can be defined on the basis of the share of disposable financial 
resources of the state and municipalities to the total income of the two different tiers of 
governments (including the grants) for the year 0. 
In the following, the measurement of the intergovernmental transfers in the case of 
adopting the principle of the parallel development of fiscal capacity between state and mu-
nicipalities is compared to the case of defining on the basis of annually fixed exogenous 
ratio (v*). 
For the latter case 
 




           SZt*         SZ0 
(15) v* = ——— = ———  . 
           ELt          EL0 
 
On the other hand, the equation (13) which considers the principle of the parallel devel-
opment of fiscal capacity changes after the rearrangement 
 
              EG0,v         EGt          EL0,v 
(16) SZt = ( ——— – ——— • ——— ) • ELt = vt • ELt  . 
                E0            ELt           E0 
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The equation (16) demonstrates clearly that the intergovernmental grant ratio is no 
longer exogenous but endogenous — partly also as a function of the current income of the 
state — when the principle of parallel development of fiscal capacity between state and 
municipalities is applied. 
Therefore, 
 
                      ELt          EGt                EG0               EL0,v 
(17) vt – v* = ( –––—– – ––—––– ) • ( ––—––– ) • ( –—–––– ) . 
                      EL0          EG0               ELt                 E0 
 
The term in the first bracket of the equation (17) shows the difference of the tax income 
growth rate between the state and that of municipalities when compared to the period 0 and 
t. For EG0 / ELt and EL0,v /E0 are always positive, vt – v* is positive when the state income 
(EL) grows faster than that of municipalities (EG) in the same period of time. 
For the next step, it is additionally considered in the model that municipalities can de-
termine their tax income through the change in  the municipal-specific raising weight 
(Hebesatz) of the municipal taxes. For simplification, we assume that there is a munici-
pal tax. And this is the only income source for municipalities before they receive grants 
from the state. On the other hand, tax and other income of the state are assumed to be 
autonomous.  
In this case 
 
(18) EGt = st • MBt 
 
where st = the (state-)average of the weighted municipal-specific tax rate and MBt = the 
(state-wide) basic tax amount of the municipal tax (Steuergrundzahl) in the period 0. 
When the principle of the parallel development of fiscal capacity between state and mu-
nicipalities applies 
 
                         EG0,v                                  EL0,v 
(19) SZt = ELt  • (——— ) – ( st • MBt  ) • ( ——— ) . 
                          E0                                      E0 
 
As a consequence  
 
                                  EL0,v 
(20) D DSZt = – MBt  • ( ——— ) • D Dst  .  
                                    E0   15
The equation (20) suggests that ceteris paribus the reduction of the weighting rate of the 
municipal tax at t leads to the increase in the intergovernmental transfers from the state for 
the same year. However, this fact does not provide any incentives to municipalities to re-
duce the effective local tax rate. The decrease in municipal tax revenue caused by the im-
plementation of such a type of fiscal measure cannot be fully compensated by the antici-
pated increase in transfers as shown in the equation (20), because 
 
               EL0,v 
(21) D DEGt,v = D DEGt + D DSZt = MBt • D Dst – MBt • ( ——— ) • D Dst  
                E0 
 
                          EL0,v 
            = ( 1 – ——— ) • MBt • D Dst   . 
                           E0 
 
 
5.   Conclusion 
 
For the future fiscal decentralisation in Eastern European transition countries a stronger 
orientation of the subsidiarity principle appears to be desirable to improve the efficiency 
in the allocation of financial resources between the different tiers of governments and 
the provision of local utilities of own immediate needs. In this context a critical exami-
nation of the scope of unconditional transfers seems to be necessary, since the domi-
nance of a purpose- and project-oriented, down-flow grant system is pronounced in 
countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary Poland and Slovakia. In particular, the 
Saxon experience with unconditional transfers from the state to municipalities in the 
German-specific federal system appears to be a helpful yardstick for the future political 
discussion aimed at improving the fiscal distribution system in many Eastern European 
transition economies. 
In this new German Land the total size of unconditional transfers is fixed annually in a 
traditional German way but under the particular consideration of the parallel development 
of the municipalities’ disposable income from local taxes and the provided intergovern-
mental transfers (by the state), on the one hand, and the disposable state income from the 
(exclusive and shared) taxes and the grants from the federal government (to the state) mi-
nus the above mentioned transfers from the state to municipalities, on the other. For the 
application of such a principle, the selection of the basis year (i.e. t = 0) i s extremely 
important, at which the relation of fiscal capacity between the jurisdictions should be   16
fully acceptable for the involved parties. The parallel principle can be ideally adopted, 
when the satisfactory level of own revenues is annually guaranteed for the grant provid-
ers so that a sufficient sum of unconditional transfers can be allocated to the recipients 
like municipalities. Furthermore, this principle presently considers solely the changes in 
annual revenues of different tiers of governments in Saxony. For this reason further ef-
forts appear to be urgently made to additionally integrate the expenditure aspects of the 
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